

Washington, in other words, wouldn't stop hedging its bets. The United States backs Mr. Karzai, but it can't relinquish its alliances with the enemies of all he stands for.

But President Karzai bears part of the blame. He, too, has been hedging his bets. His endlessly polite interactions with his predator governors are confusing his constituents. Although Washington thought firing half a dozen governors was too much, it would have supported the dismissal of one or two, and Mr. Karzai wasted a golden opportunity by refusing to do that.

The problem is, no matter what they say, these warlords aren't going to behave. They are not reformable, because it is not in their interest to reform. The warlords' livelihood depends on extremism and lawlessness. That's how they draw their pay; that's what allows them to rule by the gun in an unofficial martial law, looting villages under the pretext of mopping-up operations, extracting taxes and bribes, crushing opponents.

The American alliance with warlords also discourages ordinary Afghans from helping rebuild their country. And without the people, the process is doomed. Afghans I have met and worked with share a fierce desire to live in a normal country. They have demonstrated that desire. In the face of tremendous adversity, they have managed to open schools, clean irrigation ditches, plant trees and dig sewers. But seeing warlords regain power is making people waver. I have found in my work that more and more Afghans are withdrawing to the sidelines, subtracting their life force from the battle to reconstruct Afghanistan.

They are also increasingly wary about the elections next year. At a recent meeting here with representatives from the commission that's drafting a new constitution, a nursing student asked, "How can we freely elect our representatives with warlords controlling the countryside?"

Despite American officials' misgivings, it would not be so difficult to remove the warlord-governors. Their lack of popular support means no one would fly to their defense were they dismissed. The mere display of American backing for a plan to oust them would be enough to cow their paid liegemen. In the interest of offering Afghanistan a chance at a future, and opening the door to a new kind of relationship with the Muslim world, the United States should back any future decision to remove the warlord-governors.

For despite the rocky start to reconstructing postwar Afghanistan, an ember of hope for the country's future is still burning. Several high caliber diplomats are now at the American embassy. American military commanders, who by training focus on battle plans, have begun to realize that their activities can have unintended political consequences if they do not have intimate knowledge of the people they are dealing with. These officers have grown more alert to the ways in which local warlords may be using them. In Kandahar, the base commander has begun meeting with tribal elders to forge links with the population. In other words, the United States is finally positioned to do a good job here.

When President Bush decided to invade Iraq, he promised that Afghanistan would not be forgotten. If that promise is to mean anything, America's accumulated experience in Afghanistan must be acted upon, unequivocally. It's time to stop hedging bets.

H.R. 1828, SYRIA ACCOUNTABILITY AND LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY RESTORATION ACT OF 2003

HON. GEORGE R. NETHERCUTT, JR.

OF WASHINGTON

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, July 8, 2003

Mr. NETHERCUTT. Mr. Speaker, today I joined a growing number of my colleagues in cosponsoring H.R. 1828, the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act.

I sponsored this legislation because I believe that Syria presents a unique threat to the peace, security and stability in the Middle East. Syria is geographically central in the region, but it is also central to the peaceful evolution of the region.

Continued Syrian sponsorship of terrorism threatens to unravel renewed efforts at peace in the region. President Bush's Road Map is at risk because of this state-sponsored terrorism and we must indicate the serious consequences of Syria's destabilizing activity.

This legislation gives the President the leverage he needs to persuade the Syrian regime to reconsider its role in the region. The fall of Iraq represented only the first in a series of positive changes that will sweep through the Middle East in the coming years, and Syria has an opportunity to be on the right side of history. The possibility of this legislation becoming law should be understood as a clear warning about the position of the House of Representatives.

At the same time, I do not believe that H.R. 1828 is a perfect bill. It needs to be improved before it is sent to the President for his signature. I am cosponsoring the bill out of a desire to move this legislation forward, but believe a number of changes are necessary.

First, the legislation must specifically define the meaning of "food and medicine" in Section 5(a). Specifically, this section should be brought into conformity with the definitions of "agricultural commodity," "medicine" and "medical device" included in the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-387). Enactment of this legislation three years ago signaled Congressional intent to prohibit unilateral sanctions on food and medicine. To ensure there is no confusion by implementing agencies that have historically demonstrated hostility to excepting categories of exports from unilateral sanctions, it is necessary to include very specific definitions.

Second, the legislation must incorporate sunset clauses for both the authorization of sanctions and for any sanctions that are imposed through Section 5(a)2. Congress should not impose sanctions in perpetuity, for while we are often quick to impose sanctions; we are not nearly as effective at repealing dated restrictions. Sanctions, fundamentally, should be an aberration to how the United States approaches other nations. Our bilateral relationship should stress engagement over restrictions, but in certain exceptional cases, sanctions may be necessary. These sanctions should be temporary in nature to encourage future Congressional scrutiny of the continued value of the restrictions. Should sanctions be perceived necessary in the future than future Congresses are likely to extend the prohibitions beyond the sunset period. Sunset peri-

ods also encourage rogue regimes to recognize that there is an opportunity to improve their relations with the United States. Should rogues wish to reengage with the United States, they need only to change their behavior. Regular Congressional review of sanctions ensures that this change in behavior will have a chance to be acknowledged. Conversely, permanent sanctions can backfire by signaling to the rogue state intent to isolate, irrespective of the nation's willingness to respond with reforms. The Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act outlines a two-year sunset for unilateral agricultural or medical sanctions. H.R. 1828 must incorporate a similar sunset provision.

Third, the legislation must provide greater flexibility to the Executive Branch in the imposition of sanctions. Section 5(b) provides a waiver from the imposition of sanctions if the President determines that it is in "the vital national security interest of the United States to do so." Such a waiver sets the bar too high and is potentially restrictive of the exercise of foreign policy by the Executive Branch. The Libertad Act (P.L. 104-114), for example, sets for a "national interest" waiver for Title III sanctions.

Fourth, the legislation must place a greater priority on cooperation with our allies in the imposition of sanctions. Sanctions tend to be effective when they are imposed under a multilateral framework. Unilateral sanctions isolate the United States as much as they isolate the targeted nation. Diplomacy, as in nature, abhors a vacuum and will fill it. A loss of American influence will be replaced by other nations unless sanctions are imposed through a broad, multilateral coalition. The United States must persuade other countries to join us in sanctioning Syria if we are to have significant influence.

I offer these reservations and recommendations out of a desire to improve H.R. 1828. I recognize that peace in the Middle East depends on change in Syria. But I also believe Congress should adhere to the limitations outlined above in the imposition of unilateral sanctions. When unilateral sanctions are imposed, they should be limited in scope and limited in duration and provide significant flexibility to the Executive Branch. H.R. 1828 can be amended to incorporate these recommendations, which must be made before the legislation is sent to the President for signature.

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2004

SPEECH OF

HON. NANCY PELOSI

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, June 26, 2003

The House in Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union had under consideration the bill (H.R. 2559) making appropriations for military construction, family housing, and base realignment and closure for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2004, and for other purposes:

Mrs. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, many of us will spend part of the Independence Day work period at ceremonies marking the heroism of our